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In   this  paper  we  consider  whether  the  instability   and  the  possible  collapse of  the  Greek  Banking  
System creates a graeat  systematic  risk and   according  to  this ,the  possibility to  prevent  in  the   future the   
crisis and  collapse.,by  the   proper  use   of  supervisory  methods of  Basel I and II and  the  transformation of  the  
European  financial  structures and  procedures of  the  euro  system. 
After  the  latest development   about   Cyprus banking system Crisis and searching the reasons of this Crisis (of 
March 2013) ,before and after the decisions of Euro group (of 15/3/2013)  we  have  to  answer  about  the  situation  
that  emerged.
The  questions  was about the reformations needed  after  the  decision  of  Eurogroup ,  including   the    
shrinkage of  Cyprus banking system, to  a    more  smaller  in  capitalization and   in  volume   of  turnover, of  the  
existed banking system  in Cyprus.
  The  Eurogroup    insisted ,  that  the  size of  banking  system,  is   now  8  times   bigger  than  the G.D.P. of the  
country , asking    simultaneously  from  Cyprus  government , to   alter   the  economic  model   of  the  country, by  
reducing the  service/banking   sector, after  the  bankruptcy  of  one  at  least  of  the  two  bigger  banks .
The  big  problem emerged,  after the declaration of the suspension of the  «deposits guarantee» and the fear of  
the” Bank run “ and the following collapses of  banks  in  many  states. So   we have   to  examine    the  right   
application of   rules  and  procedures  for  the  Banking system. The  target  is to  examine      the  mistakes and  
inefficiencies ,   that  brinks the  system  very  near  to collapse, through the contagion mechanism, to the rest of 
Eurozone and mainly to Greek Banking System.
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After the above, we have to examine and  re-examine the methods of Supervision of Banking System procedures 
(choosing among other) political/country risk and credit risk, in order to increase the credibility and the soundness of 
Banking System.
So we have to analyze here a “Systematic Risk”  situation  and   analyse the  Methods referring to the supervisory 
criteria of Banking System to prevent the negative impacts  of the systematic risk, that is possible to lead to an 
“irregular” bankruptcy.
Banking  System  Inbalances; Banking  crisis; Basel II-III; Supervision  Methods; Systematic  Risk; Depositors; Confidence.
.
Searching  the latest developments   about   Cyprus banking system  Crisis and searching the reasons of this Crisis 
(of March 2013) ,before and after the decisions of Eurogroup of 15/3/2013, about the reformations which  will lead  
to  a   shrinkage   to  a    more  smaller   in  volume   of  turnover   of  the  existed  banking system  in Cyprus ,   that  
is  now  8  times   bigger  than  the G.D.P.   of  the  country.
This   means :  a) to  reduce  the  high   capitalization of  banking  system  and to  find the  amounts  for  the 
recapitalization , b)  the   split    the    size of banks   as  firms and  c)   to  reduce  the  number of  banks ,or  finally,
if  it is not   possible to achieve all   them,   to  go   in    bankruptcy every  bank, which can not  cover  their  deficits 
and  the  capital  adequacy.
This  events  of   sharp  and forced  changes,   is most   possible  to  lead to  the    collapse  of  the  two bigger 
banks of the country.
After  this evolutions, there  was   a relative concern and  the  spread  of  a  fear  between  depositors, even  in  
Germany   putting  to  an  uncertainty   the    Eurozone  the  same  and the future of Euro, as  common  currency. So 
after  all these   evolutions  and  the  psychological  environment that  created  the  degree of uncertainty increased 
for the Cyprus economy and also the possibility of Banking System to  collapse.
This  catastrophic phenomenon could affect also the Greek Banks, being in the stage of recapitalization, threatens 
also the stability of  Greek  banking  system  and  the  same  the Eurozone. So we have  here  a  typical «systematic 
Risk situation»,  which would have negative reactions generally for the Banking System in the countr
   Asking    simultaneously by  Eurogroup  decision  ,  to  alter   the  economic  model   of  the  country, by  
reducing the  service  sector   and  mainly the   Banking System.
This   means    a need  for  the  proper  recapitalization,  or  the  split  of  the  banks   as  firms ,or  the   finally the  
bankruptcy   for them. 
This  event  is  possible  to  trigger   the   collapse  of  the   two  bigger banks  and   after  this   there  is  a relative 
concern  for   Eurozone and the future of Euro, because this undermine the confidence of the depositors.
After  all this  evolutions  the  degree of uncertainty increased for the Cyprus economy and also the possibility of 
Banking System collapse, by resolving of the two bigger Banks.
This catastrophic phenomenon could affect also the Greek Banks, being in the stage of recapitalization, threatens 
alsoexcept  theGreek Banking System and the stability of Eurozone and.
After these we have a systematic Risk situation which would have negative reactions generally for the Banking 
System of the country and not only them. 
References in the newspaper about this threat of “Systematic Risk”, often brings a certain level of panic for Bank 
run   as was discussed  in  theory  and practice 
1. Int roduction
DEVELO PM ENT S A ND Q UEST IO NS ABO UT CYPRUS “ B ANK I NG SYST EM  CRI SI S”  A ND CO L LA PSE 
A ND TH E WA YS TO  RESTO RE TH E CONFIDENCE O F TH E DEPO SI TO RS.
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Simultaneously special in Greece we had the problem of the delay of recapitalization of Greek Banks and the 
joined problem of liquidity problem and capital inflows, to restore economic development.
This fact puts under suspension the safety of deposits and the great concern of depositors about this.
It is well known from economic theory, that all these thinks and events  increases the fears that a similar 
phenomenon (in smaller scale) , after the Lehman Brothers collapse, that was leaded   also ,to a fiscal burden of the 
states and governments to pay the cost for saving the banks, with tax payer money, to avoid other negative 
consequences for  the Banking and Financial System.
After this risk of collapse , the responsible authorities decided to fortify the functions of  the Banking system and 
to declare, that  they  guaranteed the deposits till 100.000 € per person.
After this declaration and the   great concern for the suspension of  the deposits guarantee and the fear of Bank 
run followed by the collapse. 
So the main thought was the avoidance of the  fear of collapse, through the contagion mechanism to the rest of the 
Eurozone and mainly to Greek Banking System.( Schoenmaker D.,1993, Internationalization  of  banking    
supervision  and  deposit  insurances. Journal of  International  banking Law, 8.)
We have seen, gradually, from the year 2008, after   the  catastrophic  spreading  of sub primes of Lehman 
Brother to all other  world financial    markets, we are watching a continuous “strike” and the devaluation of the 
confidence of investors and depositors, outside the borders of USA to other countries of the world. 
The collapse of the “structure finance” and securitization, had as impact the discouragement of self-finance 
through the assets of banks.
The collapse also of the «Interbank market» and the rise of interests rates at 25 -50 b.p. above the Euribor 
initially. 
The difficult way of  raising  capital  and liquidity, through  the  means of  “loans and receivables”, by the 
avoidance of the devaluation of the securities of banks. 
Additionally to this point the European Commission made an Intervention to “IFRS committee”, to permit the 
devortion of valuation of bank securities, that  in  other  case could lead to a direct great losses in bank «profit and 
loss account».»
The “Rating Agencies”  in  the  same  time ,degraduated the active role of banks, because of their inability to find 
long-term loans from the traditional ways. 
After this the banks turned to attract capital from the one-way «client depositors» to find new liquidity, but was 
inadequate to support (banks) Capital adequacy and the proper liquidity. 
All these    creates  the need for “State guarantees” to Banks for loans and finance, but many States was incapable 
to give this finance, because  of the  fiscal  crisis.
In the Same period ECB, created new procedures to bring short-term liquidity (1 year) and a  slack on  the  
criteria for the proper collateral  items , accepting low credibility securities as collateral for the additional finance. 
This was very great aid to banking system  to  survive.
After these events the  liquidity and  profitability of Greek banks was eliminated  irreversibly, with negative 
«contribution Margin» of  their  products  and  services.
All the above mentioned were results of the bad architecture  and the   bad Construction of the Eurozone, because 
of the non-existence of  mechanisms like  the Eurobonds, as basic instruments for the debt financing to governments 
and banks.
And as said the famous Economist (Nobel Laureate) Josef Stieglitz (in an interview), within the Eastern summit 
of IMF – 2013,  «The problems of Greece are jointed and depended from the structural problems of Euro».
2. Reasons and impacts of crisis of Greek Banking System
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Also  he  focused on the need to support financially the enterprises in the region of Europe, which was “stroked” 
unavoidable, from the problems that creates  from  a) the limited banking liquidity, b) from the bad architecture of 
Eurozone and the  weaknesses  of  Euro.
Because the Eurozone   was  based in a semi -ready plan, that confront structural problems in  the  time. 
The legal frame of Eurozone by  the  construction was  subtracted  the «basic adjustment mechanisms of 
adaptation»,as:
a) the interest rate  mechanism  and 
  b) «the currency devaluation   adjustment mechanism» and 
the weakness to replace them, with other mechanism, like the «Eurobond» and the function of «Lender of last 
resort». 
This was a serious  Architectonic fault and serious weakness of Eurozone , as a zone of  single  currency, to  
restore  the  equilibrium in  financial  markets.   Phenomenon    that  made the system of Euro unstable, created easy 
crisis ,with possibility to become a systematic crisis with  the  proper  risk. 
In the case of Greece the exclusion from the International Capital   and  Money Markets and the inability to make 
an  “Inner devaluation” of the currency,  are the main structural reasons for the crisis after 2008-9.
In the deep of debt, there is a twin substantial mechanism for  the  creation  of   the great debt and Banking crisis 
simultaneously, in the form that referred above. 
The construction of Eurozone unfortunately has no effective mechanism to reply to this problems of crisis 
deepening to  a  depression of  the  Economy.
After the above we have to examine the insolvency risk and the methods of Supervision of Banking System 
procedures ,in order to increase the credibility and the soundness of Banking System.
So we have to analyze here, the impacts of Systematic risk after  the  creation  of  Systematic  crisis , according 
the main factors of risk. 
Searching more accurately about the special components , that are used on the credit risk methodology, according 
Basel II and III and  the   procedure and  criteria of supervision, for the soundness of Banking System. 
Approaches and methods referring to the supervisory criteria of Banking System to prevent the negative impacts 
from the systematic risk, that is possible to lead to an “irregular” bankruptcy, of some Banks.
So we have there to  examine , the whole regulative system as a matter of the methods used, for the control  of  
the Banks behavior according to regulations, as a set of regulative framework of deontology and behaviour of Banks 
(Kay-Vikkers, 1988, regulatory reforms in Britain, economic policy October 1988).
We know that the financial system is not enough   able to work well , by only the existence of the “Market 
Mechanism” , to restore equilibrium of prices and factors. 
In financial Markets one of  the main matters for the “imperfect  o  asymmetric  information” and the particularity 
of the markets, is  the  “lack of information” , and  the  low knowledge  of  the  relevant  information or the 
ignorance by the investors (mainly small investors), about the Market   real conditions and  here  about   the Banks 
credibility.
The institutional framework form the beginning of Basel I to III, put a framework of three main needs: 
1)      The protection of Investors, 
2)   the protection of every firm/person that make an exchange with the banks, 
3)    the protection of the financial/banking system and the need for a common regulatory frame. Because the 
bankruptcy any (specially  the  biggest) of them, is possible to lead in the instabilisation of the whole financial 
system.
3. Methods of Supervision of Banking System procedures
The impacts of Systematic r isk
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So by the definition of systematic risk, it includes the  mean  of confidence (fidae) of the investors in the market 
and the (well done) symmetrical function of the system of clearance and settlements. (Davis F.P., (1995), “Debt 
financial fragility, and systematic risk”, London, New York,  Clavendon Press)
So Schoenmaker  (Schoenmaker, 8, 1993, International Banking Supervision and deposit insurance, Journal of 
International Banking Law)  is  referring  for the evolution of the importance of destabilization of financial system, 
though the contagion of the consequences on the bankruptcy of a bank, that   technically  evaluates the following 
regression
      % Bank Failuret = a + b % Bank Failuret-1+gZ
where Z is the “steady state variable”, as a set of macroeconomic variables, which probable affects the frequency 
of appearance of bankruptcies in banking firms.
And the terms “contagion” is defining from the binding possibility to go bankrupt the Bank J, FOJ, given the 
Bankruptcy of the firm I. F.O..
Prob (FOJ/ FOi).
Where after the evaluation of the parameter b, being more important and greater in influence  (Syriopoulos K, 
1999, International Capital Markets Theory and Analysis, Edition Anikoulas).
The empirical evidence of  the  above , means that after the banks bankruptcy of the last two months, this fact has 
a significant impact in the bankruptcy of the running month (of the searching period). 
Since taking in account the macroeconomic variables Z and the diversifications of the other financial institution, 
where the possibilities of contagion are more possible.
But others academics like Kaufman (1994), concluded that the concern about the stability of the system is too 
excessive to be true, after a Bank collapse to the other Banks.
Oppositely ,  some opinions of academics said that,  was better the absence of supervision, even for example after 
the collapse of Barings Bank and the impact to other banks, seem to be non-sense, and the level for the contagion is 
very low.
The “risk weights”  of the capital requirement of Banks to measure and to prevent the collapses are as follow.
Changes and implications, especially in the market values of loans and securities, due to the new International 
Capital requirements of the banks (according to risk-weight assets), which sets in motion these changes.
The situation has arisen, not only because of the different risk weights, to compute the new Capital requirements, 
applying into different kinds of bank’s assets, but also from the new more complex procedures, about the 
“supervisory review" of authorities and the necessity for greater information and disclosure, about banks operational 
effectiveness and profitability, in order to meet the so called “Market Discipline”, in order to be in compliance with 
the depositors and investors needs,  that must be informed about the financial situation, profitability and credibility 
of balance   sheets  and other crucial indices and   the  proper information about the Banks.
So we can say that the cooperation of supervisory authorities and information exchange between them is a very 
important think to reduce the possibility of new appearance of similar cases of collapses and bankruptcies of Banks.
For the cases to search about the impact of systematic risk there were developed the “VaR models”, (Value at 
Risk) to measure and evaluate the level of risk of Banks in any case by the assessments of the assets value and the 
jointed losses in order to find out the real Bank value. (Philippe Jorior, (2001), “Value at risk: The new benchmark 
for managing financial risk”, New York :Mc Craw- Hill)
But after the deregulation   on  Banking  functional  environment, the risk of bankruptcies is greater and we must 
settle new rules and regulations and  computations about  Risk-adjusted assets of Banks.
To this direction established  the three  pillars  of  Basel II criteria  and  later  the  Basel III ,to confront the new 
most  complicated risk environment and   the  higher uncertainty from the banking system of the interconnections of 
4. The cooperation of supervisory authorit ies  and VaR models
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factors of banking environment. (Credit Suisse Group, "The Basel Capital Accord: Consultative Paper of January 
16, 2001: Comments, May.).
Also they developed a «Metric System for Capital adequacy», in order to strengthen the conduct or management 
of the preventing supervision.
So the committee was  developed a new subject/ framework  of “Banks Risk Management” ,  with  active and 
passive   tools and measures of policy, through the portfolio differentiation,  to hedge the risk of the components and 
to measure the Net Worth (equity value) of bank.
Now is the “Capital Adequacy”   measures  (except the other indicators used, like Liquidity Index and Credibility 
Index, profitability and Equity/debt Indexes  e.t.c ) putting the limits   of  the  exposure  to  «credit   default»   risk  
and   the other  risks.
All these thinks been in a frame of “Risk-Based Capital”, as it is deriving from the different positions of their 
portfolio of financial products and the risk (uncertainty) of them depending from the differentiated market changes.
The need off 8% orlater 9% of Equity Capital to the risk-adjusted Assets of the bank, depending also from the 
degree of leverage (equity/total dept) and the maturity of loans,  in relation to the short-term obligations of the Bank 
(putting f level of liquidity).
Also beyond the Liquidity risk, Credit risk among other, the “Market Risk” is very important. So the market Risk 
– adjusted asset, which contains the losses from the inadequate liquidity during a “tied money” period, through the 
interests rates and exchange rates volatility.
The Sensitivity to losses from the types of different product (Capital Assets) and the timing and momentum in 
capital and money markets.
So Basel committee (through BIS) put the set of regulations about the 8% of supervisory capital to total assets. 
So we have to achieve the following 
A) the need for immediate capital restructuring,  to meet the Capital Adequacy.
B) the  other  alternative is the selling (by MBO or MBI) of the weak under collapse bank to other banks, 
incorporating  all the assets and or even only the assets of bank or C)  finally  the  full bankruptcy of the Bank.
According to the different methods referring below we have a brief description of them, to see the volume of 
Capital requirements.
According the “standardized method” ,which  is  so named by his structured and formal procedure of 
computations on Capital Assets of Bank, first for the “Interest Rate Risk”, the method is based in a set of 13 
different weighted limits of Maturity, within the net worth is computed between all the elements on balance-sheet 
and off-balance sheet items.
The weighs off computations are fluctuating from the 0,20% for positions till 3 months and until 12,5% for 
positions that their maturity is over 20 years.
Also for the “exchange rates risk” and the devaluation of share capital is 8%, comparing with the products of 
15%.
But, as we can imagine this procedure is inadequate to find out the maturities of the elements and also there is a 
lack of precision to compute by 8% all the different things like stocks futures and currencies.
Also there is a lack about the differentiation of the different items of a bank’s portfolio, because did not take in 
account the volatility of the returns of these elements.
After these  we  know  that is enough difficult to find the exact outcome of differentiations between different 
classes of risk, like the “Market Risk” and the “Default Risk” ,that may be inter connected with the interest rate risk
4.1. The “ credibilit y index “  of Banks according  the  Basel criter ia: 
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These inadequacies was the reason, that after the Basel II (1995) the regulation about “Market Risk” permitted to 
banks to use their own scheduled “Internal Rating-based model, for the needs of  the  minimum  capital  to be in the 
equilibrium with “Capital adequacy”.
( Basel Committee, "Working Paper on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk," September 2001).
Because Basel II and III recognized, that the same the banking firms had developed their advanced models for 
their more effective  Risk Management .
So  there was  developed The «VaR models», that are more complicated, from the standardized method,  because 
they used very clear and pragmatic quantitative inflows,  for example the time horizon of 10 days, in confidence 
level 99%, with   coefficient  of Correlations,  for the Same Class of Elements (eg. Interest rates and exchange 
rates).
Finally the   “max value of VaR” is the  additional  ( plus ) capital to be balanced   for the  requirements   of  
capital Adequacy.
The mean VaR value in the Interval of 60 days, multiplying the “hysteria factor”, that  must not be less than 3. 
This number/limit of 3 is determined by the Central Bank of the country.
MRG=max(K*1/60 S60i=1 VaRt-1 , VaRt-1)
The disadvantages and of this method lies in the weakness of the way of Computation of VaR (Value at Risk) 
coefficients, by the Central Bank, underestimating       the estimations about   VaR , as an Internal model of any 
individual Bank and the small time period of computations by the bank ,because the result for bigger periods will 
not be accurate.
Another approach developed by the “Federal Reverse board” of USA after 1995 is the so-called “pre-
commitment Approach” where the bank is committed for the maximum losses for a time period and if exceed the 
declared losses the supervisory authority imposes a certain money penalty. So the choice of capital Adequacy is by 
the same the bank and FED is watching the divergences.
The Pillar II of Basel  also  is referring to the disclosure of the financial information about the bank (and any 
firm). The target is to  be  recognized , from any investor the risks that exists with any bank. .             
The new features and “building blocks” concept.Which  are :
More driven approach, recognizing diversity. 
Internal Ratings.
Operational risk.
Credit risk mitigation.
Securitization frame work
        But   many  believes  that , the  new framework  will  be  more  effective,  if  it  based on:
1. a  ” , about Functions and  Decisions  within  the  banks 
.
2. And  the  “ ”, 
So,  mainly  here  the targets , are and the rules of safety, internal Audit, so  as   
to brink the so called “Market Discipline”.
The control of the   higher level of risk,  by the market factors and investors.
So the publicity policy about   the  quality of Capital structure and Capital adequacy, the supervisory framework, 
the application of  corporate governance  rules, the methods of risk assessment and the level of capital shortages, 
from all the items and sources of capital means.
4.2. The  “ Internal Rating-based models”   and  Risk  Management
4.3. The “ disclosure  pr inciple”   about  informat ion  and the Market Discipline
st ronger   foundation of “ Corporate Governance
improvements to internal report ing
the effective Risk Management





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,After the above, if the bank have effective systems of Risk Management then they might to reduce the capital 
requirements and to attract new clients, with a better dept behavior.
So  it  depends  from the ability of the investor/depositor to decide if  or not to invest in a bank A, that is high 
risky, because he knows that this bank invest (their money) in high risk investment products, or giving loans with 
greater degree of default, like the two (2) main Cypriot banks which have made investments, buying e.g. Greek State 
bonds from the secondary market and giving big loans to low credibility firms, given the losses from high default 
from them.
So we have the valuation of  application of the basic principles , about  the Banking Industry soundness.
By this way of the prerequisites of Basel Pillar III (of Basel committee) believes that will strengthen the stability 
of financial/banking system, named as “MARKET DISCIPLINE”. That means to schedule the proper tools of 
disclosure to the public according the general principles of publication of all relevant information, that must cover 
the following principles ,(Schiniotakis N. – Sylligardos K., 2010, Bank Management and Financial Risk, Edition 
Disigma – Thessaloniki:
a) The publication principles and procedures.
b) The Capital Adequacy and Capital Structure.
c) Issues about the application of supervisory frame.
d) Corporate Governance and Internal Control.
e) Risk assessment and Risk Management.
f) The high (level) of the deficiencies and uncovered position.
All the above must be published two times, or at least once, per year.
Also, the committee made the proposition of the “test of Materiality”, that means that the relative information is 
material, as long as the faulted expression or neglection could change the decision of the receiver according to the 
kind of decision to invest or deposit in a weak or very risky bank.
Because the whole frame of the deposits protection is changing, after the statements by the  very  new president 
of Eurogroup Mr. Dieselblum,( Nea Newspaper 2013,statements 26-03-2013) that the Cyprus Bank experience of 
the sudden cutting (haircut) of  the deposit accounts of the people, is possible to  be repeated and for other bank (in 
every states), if their Management fails and has deficits and losses from the “red loans”, that can create a certain  
bankruptcy of the bank. 
So, the same the depositors, must be transformed as investors, that  means that  they  must be   analyzing and 
watching  the “ statements  of  the  bank “continuously  and they must cover the deficits of the bank if  it  fail. 
So depositors, must be transformed as new stockholders ,with  impact the ”cutting   of  a proper amount from 
their deposits  to  cover  the  losses. 
This is a great turning point for the banking system  functions and  principles.
After this new possibility to haircut the deposit accounts of banks we have a suspension of deposits safety and 
this is uprising the level A of systematic risk of Banking System. Because of the appearance of the “Bank run” 
phenomenon will be most frequently, as  behavior  of   the depositors.
(Diamond, D.W. and P.H. Dybvig (1986): "Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation," Journal 
of Business).
So after this, the depositors must be more informed and most careful to watch  andanalyse  the Bank   Balance 
Sheet  and accounts and the credibility, stability and soundness of every bank  as financial firm.
So here we must make a reference to the weak points of regulations of the Basel II and III for to strengthen the 
Banks financial position. (Basel Committee, "The New Basel Accord").
5. The cr it icism and the posit ive advantages about of Basel I I  and I I I  – The impacts 
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Risk Techniques
Initially banks with effective Risk Management system, procedures and methodology, would be in a position to 
reduce effectively their “Capital Adequacy position”, in order to attract better clients with better loan-taking 
behavior by reducing the interest rate of their loans, as a reword of their quality .
Specially in the sector of Retail banking and the Mortgage loans, in relation with the big Corporations loans 
given by other banks.
This event will change the Corporate Strategy of banks leading and directing them to increase their share market 
and for the SME’s market for finance.
Simultaneously these effective banks takes a capital advantage, by the reducing the amount for Capital 
Adequacy, and so the bigger profits, from the low defaults rate, will make a more generous dividend policy, giving 
higher dividends and making higher investments. (Kareken, J.H., and N. Wallace (1978): "Deposit Insurance and 
Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," Journal of Business).
So depending to the assessment method a) the standardized method and b) the IRB-method, the first bank will be 
more vulnerable, to an MBI’s (Management Buy In) aggressive movement –than the bank using the IRB method, 
which requires lower capital.
The reason will be that ,by  the IRB  method used by a  bank , it will have more   free Capital , from the  amount  
of Capital Adequacy requirements.
An other impacts is, that bank with lower “credit rating” from the level   of A. Then they will have 50% instead 
of 20% Capital requirements and so is obliged to find other ways for the short-term financing needs.
So depending for  any banks with “credit rating” AA/AAA, ,the Capital Adequacy will be 20%. For example the 
weighed coefficient for Mortgage loans will be 35% (from 50%), if the bank uses the standardized method, and only 
10% if uses the IRB method. Subsequently on the corporate policies some banks will be focused to finance special 
purpose loans, giving more credit products with lower interest rate.
So the level of disclosure (market discipline) imposed by Basel II, giving grater transparency, will lead the 
Banking firms to a better quality of their Portfolios.
And these events will attract more and better clients, because of the lower risk, to deposit their money to  a  bank 
named G. 
So this need  to  be  more  conscious, about the usefulness to inform and analyze this framework of Basel  
committee ,is  very  important in  any  case.
So the rules and regulations of Basel II and mainly III, brings a new organizational chart for Banks.
So, there is  a  real need to hire more experienced and educated clerks about «Risk Management techniques», 
which will be able to contribute more  effectively , to decision making process on banking selection criteria.
Also is needed to buy new information technology for the accounting system and new risk management 
programs, to confront credit risk, credit rating, operational risk and market risk as the new components of Pillar III.
So the credit institutions must develop a modern business plan, with incorporation of Risk Management. 
These firms would have the realadvantage , in the high Competitive banking market.
These banks with advanced Risk Management methods will give a greater security to their clients, investors and 
depositors and will survive in the competitive Banking Market. (Philippe Jorior, (2001), “Value at risk : The new 
benchmark for managing financial risk”, New York : Mc Craw- Hill)
And we must point out that the relevant cost of operations and the higher cost of Capital will be counteracted by 
the greater safety of the bank and the safety of depositors and the sustainable development of the banks for the 
interests of workers, stockholders, depositors and any other stakeholder.
The need for a more effective framework of banks operations was more obvious after the financial crisis of 2008 
and the impacts are the reformations and coverage of the weaknesses of Basel II regulations and .
So after the G20 Summit of 2009, begins a new frame for more «effective financial governance».
6. The haircut   of  the deposits is a very catastrophic event for  the  confidence  to  banking  system.
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“
3) Basel III about Capital 
Adequacy.
” ,
Specially after the “ , the European Council , decided to create a new architecture of 
financial system, based on Risk Management and Risk-adjusted procedures.
The central/basic elements of this new schedule was :
1) The Creation of a ”, with the participation of E.C.B. and member the 27 governor 
of Central Bank of E.U. and the 3 presidents of European Supervisory authorities of Banking and Stock 
Exchange, plus a member of European Commission.
The duties of this council are to analyze information about the financial stability and the relevant propositions.
2) The establishment of a “ ” with the 3 supervisory authorities of E.U. for the 
harmonization of application of the Supervisory rules. At parallel there will settle and a national level 
auditors/super visors.
The strengthening of new more advanced rules based in the new provisions of 
4) Subjects about the future  of European System about the settlement of new procedures and “Crisis 
management” and bankruptcy procedures and possibly with the cooperation with E.C.B., for the definition of 
“settlement criteria group”. And possibly the establishment of “ supplementary 
with the national systems. And the creation of “European Banking Union” under common rules, that will 
extend the security of the depositors.
The uprising of “Risk Management Systems”and  the“Internal Audit” of Banks, as a supplementary structure, 
because the fact that proves that the existing application of this system was not enough to predict and prevent a new 
financial crisis in the future.
So is discussing the application of a more severe Institutional frame about Systematic Risk.
But we ask, if is only the weaknesses of Institutions and framework to prevent the Crisis, is the unique factor 
dealing effectively with risk?
Because the fact from the real life shows that also that central banks and governments of the countries (like the 
Cyprus Case) are responsible for the Crisis. Because instead to confront the several difficult situation problems, they 
delayed to react and to intervene earlier  to stop the crisis in-time?
The relevant references of the responsibilities are displayed in the every day newspapers of this period. As 
conclusion we have to refer that, the above framework of reasons, brings the confusion after the application of the 
above mentioned rules and regulations and, as it proved from the fact, it is no easy to change the habits and ways 
and practices and mentalities of banking clerks and managers.
It’s known for example that all or some of the ex-presidents of the Laiki Bank of Cyprus (Popular Bank of 
Cyprus), violated and broken all the existed procedures of assessment principles and practices, to avoid the non-
credible firms and entrepreneurs. None stopped them to broke the rules, none controlled the right application of 
criteria and so they increased by 9,5 billion € of new depts. In two (2) years period (2011-2012).
Where was the disclosure of the credibility analysis and the followed ratings for the safety of their shareholders 
and depositors?
Where were the “Risk management unit” and the proper references to Central Bank and the supervising 
mechanism of Central Bank, to prevent the destruction of the 2 bigger Cypriot banks?
Now the destruction and the collapse of the banks come with a very strict and sadden way.
Where is now the credibility of the banking system?
Where are the methods and procedures to confront the bank risks?
Why the financial system has not enough strong policies and practices to avoid them?
de L arossiere report”
7. Summarizing the new proposit ions and developments :
Systematic Risk Council
System of Financial Supervisors
deposits guarantee system
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After the above has risen a big problem and   a  big question.
Where is the European Solidarity to countries which are in crisis?
It seems that the nationalistic interests of some countries, are now the new concept for a new beginning for 
banking policy.
This is the forced collapse of Cyprus Banking system and so the collapse of the 40% of the GDP of the country, 
because the banking sector was 7 times greater that the GDP. And within an intension to punish Cyprus, the 
Eurogroup decided in 15 March 2013 to resolve the second (in size) bank “Laiki” (Popular Bank of Cyprus) and to 
haircut the 70%-80% of the depositors accounts and 30% of the next “Cyprus Bank”, which is the biggest of the 
Country. (Kathimerini Newspaper, 2013, 24-3-2013)
But the most disappointed matter is the statement of the president of the Eurogroup, that the Cyprus Economic 
model must change by a violent way and this is valid for all the banks everywhere in Eurozone. So the possibility is 
open to apply this kind of haircut of deposits for any bank having deficits. ( Kahane, Y. (1977): "Capital Adequacy 
and the Regulation of Financial Intermediaries," Journal of Banking and Finance)
This is a “Tectonic Movement” of the “Safety Principles” of the banking System and destroys the holly cows of 
the bank industry.
The result, the great concern and fear to all depositors of the member states of Eurozone (17 members) and the 
whole the E.U. (of 27 members).
As a result the immediate fall of Euro exchange rate to lowest level of the last 6-months.
):
The existence of European Banking Union will delay or inert the speed of the oncoming crisis. The absence of 
the EBU between the countries of the Eurozone will make to multiply and complicate the crisis phenomenon. So 
delays for the existing European Banking Union will increase the systematic risk for the banking system of 
Eurozone.
And in this case we have a greater fear of a «sudden death» phenomenon, that is not restorable, having as result 
the depositor losses.
The provisions for the creation of ) are:
1) The right of European authority to decide for “life and death” of every bank, every even big bank.
2) Enforcement from the ESM mechanism, with liquidity and capital to the viable banks, if the bank needs
this liquidity.
3) European guarantee for the deposits safety (till 100.000 € per person).
We are very astonished and questioning, if the Cyprus banks phenomenon of sudden collapse would not appear, 
if in this period of time there was established the EBU and the guarantee from this Union.
Now a days the German political and economic power, postponed the banks unification, under the point of their 
own national interests and interests of German banks. This means:
a) that the common currency unit (Euro) was  demolished, because of the “two speed situation”, as long as the 
100.000 guarantee of deposits , will not be equal for Germany and the other weak economically states. 
b) The massive refuge of the deposits and capital from the weak country with the weak guarantee. This is the 
reason for the deposits guarantee.
c) The aftermaths of the « (French  city)of European Council, before two and a half years, 
whichdecision was the reason ,initially for the devaluation of the bonds values and secondly, this evil goes to the  
devaluation  by  the  haircut  of  the deposits (bail in)     of peoples deposits in Banks.
Under this situation of the of Eurozone, we have the increasing of the capital movements  
8. The violat ion of European Union pr inciples of solidar ity and stabil ity of Banking System
The decision of Eurogroup – 15 of March as   an  out rage  action .
The need of “ European banking Union”  (EBU
“
Deauvills decision»
European banking Union” (EBU
asymmetric density
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towards the Banks of North of Europe (Sweden, Finland, Germany, Nederland) also in Swiss and even towards 
U.S.A. and other “tax heavens” worldwide.
Another basic question is, the  case  where  the Cypriot banks was in a position to cover the 9% of «
», if they have enough time with  inner  resources .
Here we must point  out , that the “ ”, was estimated that the two bigger 
banks of Cyprus (Cyprus Bank and   Popular Bank), was needed to cover the following amounts:
A)   A 3,6 billion € from the case of Greek state debt haircut, by the P.S.I., after the Troika’s decision.
B)   The additional (plus) losses from the degradation of Cyprus bonds in the level of Junks.
C)    Plus the losses from the defaulted loans, to a sum of 23 billion or the 23% of the total loans.
The additional   initial aid from Cyprus state, of 1,8 billion in July 2012, was quite inefficient to solve the 
problem. 
The public debt of Cyprus was uprising from the 49% of GDP in 2008, to the level of 87% in 2012. 
So Cyprus was needed a total sum of 17 billion € and the 10 billion of them was given from the   Eurogroup .
The remaining 7 billions must be founded from the inner of the country. 
So Eurogroup decided to shrink the bank sector of Cyprus gradually till 2018, destroying the economic model of 
the island,  which was based in the service sector of banking,  which was really over-volumed and overvalued.
Many academics, journalists and politicians were stated that:
The restructure of Cyprus model ,was founded on the principles of the extreme  ideological  frame of  Neo-
liberalism. 
The model was based on the hot money  movements, or even   partially on black market capital, by   the different 
kinds of speculators.
The “No voting” by the Cyprus parliament, was a very controversial act   according to the  conservative  groups 
and  the real situation needed  to cover the deficits and debts of the banking system,  through  the  bail in .
The real problem of the Cypriot banking System   is  the  situation , that  it holds and manages Capital of 8 times 
bigger than the GDP, without having their own capital corresponding  to  the deposits (and the rest of assets)  to 
refund the above mentioned needs, according to the Basel II Capital Adequacy criteria.
So , many of them said that a good solution would was, to use the “bail in” and   sources from the internal capital 
market of the country, that was  enough to cover the deficits of Banks, without to put in chaos the Cyprus economy.
The recent financial/crisis showed the weaknesses and inefficiencies of financial system and the results of the 
«deregulation» of banking system procedures and their soundness. Also we can see the gaps in the system 
regulations to prevent the disruption phenomena and the   effectiveness of crisis management to a rout for the 
solution of crisis. 
So we have to understand the negative impacts that imply the revision of the whole framework of system  
calibrations  and  right  application of  the  preventive  rules  and  regulations and  functions concerning corrective 
measures,  relating on Banks actions. 
This is the basic factor that contributes to the appearance of the deepening and the extension of crisis and later the 
recession in the economy.
Which is the role of the great development of a numerous banks and other financial institutions and the great 
number of interconnections and the complexity of the existing and disposal financial products, which   created the 
expansion of the level of crisis and the disability to control the negative tendencies leading to the recession, in 
counties like Greece with the huge fiscal problems. 
After this phenomena we must go to a new improved architecture of the world and  European  financial system,  
upon which  must  be  applied the supervision of financial system in European and world level. 
tier 1 
capital
European Banks Author ity – EBA
9. Conclusion
The inefficient of supervision and controll ing procedures of financial system.
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This means to establish new structures ,functions ,rules and  regulations , that must be able to prevent the 
financial/Banking  crisis in the future,   in  order  to  make milder the impacts of crisis to Banks ,enterprises and  the   
totality of economic system. 
The basic pillar of this new architecture will be a new kind of regulations about the supervision and control and 
analysis of the relevant information and data about the quality functions of the Banking/financial markets and 
institution. With main targets to analyze and evaluate risks, facing the appearance of the negative impacts of 
financial functions.
All the above, in relation to the specific purpose, about the right way and the validity and capacity of system 
management and the supervision of all kinds of financial institutions, for their compliances with the new credible 
rules about the banks.
Functions which in other case will lead in crisis, the components/parts or the whole financial system focused to a 
situation of the general stability of the financial system.Follow  below a table  of  indices of  the  Greek  economy about  debt,
as  estimations  of  Bank  of  Greece
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
260.439 297.264 334.273 358.793 328.412 331.120
Debtinothercurrencies 1.632 1.260 6.013 9.185 14.818 21.200
?. Debtofcentral  
government l
As % of  GDP 112,50% 128,90% 149,70% 171,10% 170,80% 182,50%
?.Debtofbroadpublic 
minus  investments in 
public  bonds. 
Debtofcentralgovernment  
as 
As  %  ofGDP 123,30% 139,50% 155,70% 175,70% 173,10% 184,90%
As  %  ofGDP 113,00% 129,40% 145,00% 165,30% 169,50% 179,30%
262.071 298.524 340.286 367.978 343.230 352.320
25.042 24.682 13.555 9.910 4.590 4.600
C. 
ESA (A+B)
287.113 323.206 353.841 377.888 347.820 356.920
D. Debtoflocalgover-
minus intra government  
debt
-23.829 -23.522 -24.307 -22.288 -7.220 -10.720
S?. Debtofgeneralgover-
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